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INTRODUCTION
Since the NAACP Legal Defense Fund's landmark success in
Brown v. Board of Education,1 public interest law ("PIL") has
occupied a special place in American conceptions of law and social
change. The efforts of lawyers in the civil rights movement led other
groups to see law as an instrument for social justice. As the 1960s
came to a close, public interest law organizations ("PILO") had
become an established form of social movement organization with a
distinctive role in the American legal system.2 For example, a classic
article in law and social science, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead:
Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, considered the potential
effects of PIL firms as compared to other highly effective modes of
private legal representation.' Another indication of the prominence
PILOs had gained was a comprehensive survey conducted by
Weisbrod, Handler, and Komesar in 1975 ("the Weisbrod study"),
which examined seventy-two PIL firms in existence at that time.4
Although not a study of all the PIL firms operating at the time, this
study was a good representation of what the industry was like in
1975. 5
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Although perhaps the most famous of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund's judicial victories, it was far from the first. The NAACP Legal Defense
Fund won numerous cases prior to Brown v. Board of Education. NAN ARON, LIBERTY
AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980S AND BEYOND 9 (1989).
2. See ARON, supra note 1, at 10.
3. See Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95,114-23 (1974).
4. PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1-3,50-
60 (Burton A. Weisbrod et al. eds., 1978) [hereinafter PUBLIC INTEREST LAW].
5. Joel F. Handler et al., The Public Interest Law Industry, in PUBLIC INTEREST
LAW, supra note 4, 42, 42-79. Handler and his colleagues identified eighty-six
organizations in total, but limited their analysis to seventy-two of those for reasons that
are not entirely clear.
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The Weisbrod study concluded that while PIL firms had
"contributed to equity and efficiency by providing more
representation for underrepresented collective interests, 6 they also
"confront[ed] barriers that limit [their] success either inside or
outside the courtroom."7 In the authors' view, because PILOs were
then "at a crossroads, where the form and level of governmental
support for PIL-type activities as well as the continuity of private
foundation support are being reconsidered, PIL may have a future
quite unlike its past."8
Which path have PILOs taken in the nearly thirty years since this
study? That is the subject of this Article, which is part of a larger
empirical study of PILOs and the lawyers who work within them. In
this Article we concentrate on how PILOs have changed over time.
That is, we return to fundamental questions about how these
organizations are financed, the nature of the work they perform, the
types of causes they represent, and the personnel they employ. We
find notable shifts in the organizational structures and activities of
PILOs. These shifts suggest that the role of PIL has changed in the
last three decades. Given the potential importance of PILOs' efforts
to achieve social change, we consider the implications of these
changes.
The major transformations we observe in PILOs are: (1) growth
in average organization size, especially growth in the size of the
largest organizations in the field; (2) organizational rationalization
similar to that observed in private sector law firms and law
departments; (3) a shift from single issue and single (legal) function to
multiple issue and multiple services/functions; and (4) more
government support (and restrictions) for PILOs that choose to
accept public funds.9
While it is difficult to summarize a variety of rather complex
changes in a single term or phrase, the theme that emerges is that the
nature of PILOs has shifted. In the 1970s, PILOs were primarily law
reform organizations interested in using litigation-oriented strategies
to pursue social change for disadvantaged groups. Our empirical
study shows that in 2004, a significant segment of the PILO industry
was made up of direct services organizations interested in providing
direct legal services to individual clients representing a multitude of
constituencies, including many that differ from the traditional poverty
6. PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 4, at 554.
7. Id. at 556.
8. Id. at 558.
9. See infra Part III.
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and civil rights constituencies of the past."° Thus, the field of public
interest law has matured but still embodies many of the tensions that
have been present in public interest lawyering for many years.
This Article proceeds in five Parts. Part I details the reasons for
studying PILOs, including a brief discussion of background data
about the public interest industry and its relationship to the legal
profession more generally. Part II details the methodologies of two
studies of PILOs in the United States, the Weisbrod study conducted
in 1975 and the authors' recent study of PILOs in 2004. Part III
analyzes the transformation of PILOs from 1975 to 2004. Part IV
moves from exploring changes in PILOs over time to addressing
differences between PILOs that received Legal Services Corporation
("LSC") funding in the year 2004 and those that did not.
Part V concludes by assessing the implications of the changes we
see in the field. We observe that as PILOs are increasing in size and
budget, two distinct sectors of the PILO industry are emerging-
publicly-funded organizations and privately-funded organizations.
The publicly-funded organizations focus almost exclusively on
poverty law practice. These organizations operate with relatively
large budgets, but their representation of those living in poverty is
constrained by federally-imposed restrictions on PILOs that accept
government funding. The privately-funded organizations operate on
smaller budgets but enjoy greater freedom in the practice of law,
which results in less emphasis on individual representation and a
greater focus on large scale social change. This division means that
those individuals least able to access justice-those living in
poverty-are represented by lawyers who are the most constrained in
the practice of law.
I. THE PILO INDUSTRY: POLITICAL CHANGES, IMPORTANCE TO
THE PROFESSION, AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES TO THE
ORGANIZATIONAL FIELD
Access to justice long has been a concern of the American legal
profession.11  Early efforts focused on individual pro bono
representation, but in the twentieth century, a new organizational
10. See infra Part I.B.
11. See Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity In Law, in BUSINESS: A PROFESSION
313, 322-23 (1914) (articulating the professional obligation for a commitment to providing
legal services to the poor in the Progressive Era). See generally ARON, supra note 1, at 6-
14 (discussing the evolution of PIL in private foundations, the federal government, the
bar, and law schools); Oliver A. Houck; With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1439-43
(1984) (discussing the development of PIL from 1879 to 1984).
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form-the PILO--emerged as an important vehicle for this concern.
These free-standing, voluntary organizations typically are established
to further particular causes, such as environmental protection or
racial justice, or simply to provide the poor with access to the civil
litigation system. 2 In this Part, we discuss the importance of PILOs
to the legal profession and structural changes in PILOs. The purpose
of this Part is to put PILOs in context within the larger American
legal profession and to raise questions about PILOs that require
empirical analysis.
A. Symbolic and Practical Importance of the PILO Industry to the
Legal Profession
PIL, broadly conceived, can be thought of as the "effort[] to
provide legal representation to interests that historically have been
unrepresented or underrepresented in the legal process"'3 and has its
roots in a conception of the legal profession that has an ethical
obligation to ensure representation for all.' 4 Although early efforts to
meet this obligation took the form of private attorneys providing pro
bono legal services for those unable to pay, the early part of the
twentieth century saw the emergence of more formally organized
legal aid in the United States. 5 This legal aid movement primarily
sought to provide basic representation for the poor in everyday legal
matters. 16 As such, it was part of a Progressive Era effort to integrate
poor, immigrant populations into mainstream American society.'"
Of course, PILOs are one of many avenues through which the
legal profession attempts to provide disadvantaged groups with access
to representation. Large law firms increasingly tout their
commitment to pro bono legal services" and the American Bar
12. See Houck, supra note 11, at 1439-41 (identifying three large movements in public
interest law-poverty, civil liberties, and civil rights).
13. ARON, supra note 1, at 3.
14. See id. at 120; JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE'S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION 1 (1982);
Brandeis, supra note 11, at 322-23.
15. See ARON, supra note 1, at 7; KATZ, supra note 14, at 34; see also Brandeis, supra
note 11, at 344-46.
16. KATZ, supra note 14, at 34-40; see also Edward H. Levi, Foreword to GORDON
HARRISON & SANFORD M. JAFFE, THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAW FIRM: NEW VOICES FOR
NEW CONSTITUENCIES 7, 7-8 (1973).
17. HARRISON & JAFFE, supra note 16, at 29.
18. In 1993, the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Pro Bono and
Public Service formed the "Law Firm Pro Bono Project," which challenged law firms to
commit to contributing three to five percent of their billable hours to pro bono service. As
of 2005, 138 law firms had accepted the challenge. See STANDING COMM. ON PRO BONO
& PUB. SERV., AM. BAR ASS'N, SUPPORTING JUSTICE: A REPORT ON THE PRO BONO
WORK OF AMERICA'S LAWYERS 7 (2005) [hereinafter ABA PRO BONO REPORT],
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Association recently undertook an empirical study regarding the
degree to which lawyers in private practice perform legal services for
free or reduced fees.19 While these efforts are significant,"° PILOs
remain the primary institutionalized structure for serving the civil
legal needs of those who cannot otherwise afford a lawyer. In
addition, PILOs are virtually the only institutionalized means for
supporting dedicated, experienced lawyers with expertise in the
particular legal areas most relevant to representing poor,
disadvantaged, or underserved constituencies.
PILOs differ from private law firms in that their primary goals
focus on social justice or social change through law reform, rather
than profit.21 Despite the legal profession's commitment to and
recognition of the need for pro bono services,22 law practice in the
private sector is profit driven. For lawyers in solo and small firm
practice,23 large private law firms,24 and the corporate context,
2 5
empirical studies show that the practice of law is a business that must
be organized to ensure economic survival.2 6 PILOs are different
precisely because the economic imperative is secondary to the
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/probono/report.pdf; see also Pro Bono
Institute at Georgetown University Law Center, Law Firm Pro Bono Challenge List of
Signatories, http://www.probonoinst.org/challenge.sigs.php (last updated Oct. 31, 2005)
(providing a list of all the current signatories to the pro bono challenge).
19. ABA PRO BONO REPORT, supra note 18, at 4-5.
20. See Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5, 99-106
(2004) (arguing that the efforts of pro bono lawyering in settings other than PILOs dwarf
the amount of public interest lawyering that occurs in them).
21. See Houck, supra note 11, at 1419-21.
22. COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM, AM. BAR ASS'N, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC
SERVICE: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 47-50
(1986); Brandeis, supra note 11, at 322-23. See generally ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE
LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993) (detailing the
structural barriers that prevent individual lawyers from doing public good).
23. See CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES
OF SOLO AND SMALL-FIRM ATTORNEYS 1-3, 67-86 (1996) (discussing how small and solo
firms organize themselves).
24. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 271-72 (1988); Robert L. Nelson & David
M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context,
in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROFESSION 191, 205-07 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (analyzing the ABA
commission study suggesting that economic forces have changed the legal profession).
25. Robert L. Nelson & Laura Beth Nielsen, Cops, Counsel and Entrepreneurs:
Constructing the Role of Inside Counsel in Large Corporations, 34 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
457, 474-77 (2000) (discussing ways in which corporate counsel behavior may reflect the
realities of business).
26. Houck, supra note 11.
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organization's purposes.27 To be sure, PILOs must have sources of
income to pay salaries and operating expenses, but they are not
driven by the same profit motive as firms in private law practice.
Rather than being controlled by the profit motive, however, PILOs
may be constrained by restrictions that accompany funding from the
federal government.
PILOs must engage in extensive fundraising activities to fund
litigation costs. This diverts significant time and energy from other
objectives.28 Dependence on charitable funding may undercut PILO
lawyers' professional independence, as they must be sensitive to the
wishes and agendas of those that fund their work.29 As such, it is
important to understand the sources of PILO funding. Has it
changed over time? Is the government or private funding primarily
supporting the practice of public interest lawyering in these
organizations? Are PILOs performing primarily direct legal services
or are they engaged in law reform activities? Do PILO activities
differ by whether they are publicly or privately funded?
B. Political Transformation in the Public Interest Law Industry
Until very recently, much of the research on public interest
lawyers and public interest lawyering has focused on lawyers for the
poor, or on lawyers engaged in civil rights litigation or poverty
litigation against welfare agencies.3" "Traditional" public interest
practice has also been thought to include representing clients who are
historically underrepresented in the adversarial legal system, such as
consumers or environmental groups.3 This focus on poverty practice
27. The government does exert control, via funding restrictions, on about a quarter of
PILOs that receive Legal Services Corporation funding from the federal government. We
discuss this at more length in Part IMIE, infra, but our purpose here is to point out that
there is a sector of organized practice dedicated to serving the underrepresented that is
autonomous.
28. See infra Part III.E.
29. Although private firms also must be sensitive to the desires of their larger clients,
escaping these limits on legal practice is theoretically one important advantage of
practicing in PIL firms.
30. See KATZ, supra note 14, at 7-8, 34-104 (examining the history of legal assistance
lawyers and agencies). But see ARON, supra note 1, at 63-84 (examining a range of public
interest practices, including conservative agendas); John P. Heinz et al., Lawyers for
Conservative Causes: Clients, Ideology and Social Distance, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 5, 7
(2003) (analyzing furtherance of conservative principles under the PIL framework); but cf
CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
passim (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998) [hereinafter CAUSE LAWYERING]
(compiling essays by various authors on "cause lawyering").
31. Karen O'Connor & Lee Epstein, Rebalancing the Scales of Justice, 7 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 483, 484-93 (1984) (describing the rise of "liberal" PIL).
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and underrepresented causes may be due to the way that PILO
practice itself developed-largely on the left, based on the early
models of effective litigation provided by civil rights organizations
such as the NAACP.
32
Increasingly, however, conceptions of PIL and public interest
lawyering as not-for-profit law practice include ideological causes
divorced from issues of poverty, but not necessarily from issues of
wealth distribution.33 For example, some PILOs, such as the Pacific
Legal Foundation and the Washington Legal Foundation, focus on
market-based policies and the support of "free enterprise."34 Others
represent interests primarily associated with business. Still other
PILOs pursue traditionally conservative agendas regarding individual
rights, such as promoting prayer and other forms of religious
expression in schools.3 6 The addition of a more conservative agenda
for some PILOs and public interest lawyers means that a new
understanding of this area of practice, and of the typical PILO
organizational structure in which it is embedded, is overdue.
Studying only the "traditional" conception of public interest
lawyering risks missing a significant segment of the PILO field and of
public interest lawyering.37 Although this Article does not specifically
examine the political ideology of PILOs, we do explore topical
diversity to ask whether public interest lawyering with PILOs
changed dramatically, whether modern PILOs are championing
similar causes as were championed in 1975, or whether new areas of
practice are supplanting old ones.38
32. See Handler et al., supra note 5, at 44 (discussing the origins of the modern
concept of PIL).
33. See JEAN STEFANCIC & RICHARD DELGADO, NO MERCY: How
CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL
AGENDA 140-57 (1996) (analyzing seven "conservative" legal campaigns and their
effects); Heinz et al., supra note 30, at 7 (presenting systematic data on the characteristics
of a relationship among lawyers affiliated with organizations active on a selected set of
seventeen conservative issues).
34. See O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 31, at 495-501 (describing the traditionally
conservative national and regional interests that these firms promote).
35. Houck, supra note 11, at 1454 (studying PIL and its practice by legal foundations
created, funded, and directed by American corporations).
36. See, e.g., DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist., 196 F.3d 958, 962 (9th Cir. 1999)
(involving a case litigated by the Individual Rights Foundation dealing with the posting of
religious material in a public school).
37. See Heinz et al., supra note 30, at 5 (describing how lawyers working on the
conservative side of the political spectrum have received little academic attention).
38. Although the 1990s brought scholarly debate about the "new" conservative
PILOs, this trend was recognized by scholars as early as 1983. See ARON, supra note 1, at
4 ("[PIL is practiced by organizations that span the ideological spectrum.").
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C. Transformations of the Legal Profession
Between 1975 and 2004, an organizational restructuring of law
practice has taken place in virtually every arena of legal practice.
For-profit law firms, in-house corporate counsels' offices, and
government legal departments all have increased dramatically in size
during this period. The percentage of lawyers operating within some
kind of law practice organization is on the rise.39
Two major studies of lawyers in Chicago suggest the magnitude
of this change. Researchers found that in 1975 a mere 15% of lawyers
working in private firms worked in firms with 100 or more attorneys,
but by 1995, the number had grown to 41%, and 22% of lawyers
practicing in Chicago in 1995 worked in firms with 300 or more
attorneys.4 ° Similarly, organizations employing government lawyers
grew dramatically from 1975 to 1995. In the business world,
corporate counsels' offices also increased in size, nearly tripling from
an average of twenty-one to fifty-five lawyers between 1975 and
1995. 41 In 1975, prosecutors' offices more than quadrupled, going
from employing an average of 127 lawyers to 543 lawyers.4 These
data indicate that, at least in the for-profit industry, an increasing
proportion of the legal profession is now employed within some sort
of organizational context and that these organizations are growing at
a dramatic rate.
But what about PIL practice? Have these organizations grown in
size as dramatically? If so, what, if anything, does this mean for law
reform strategies of PILOs? What impact would this have on their
capacity to perform direct legal services for clients? We know very
little about these employing organizations. And, as indicated above,
the organizations themselves are subject to very different kinds of
motivations and exogenous forces that may shape both organizational
structure and the decisions of lawyers to practice within them. These
questions and others motivated us to undertake a large-scale study of
PILOs in 2004.
39. EVE SPANGLER, LAWYERS FOR HIRE: SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AT WORK 9-
10 (1986) ("At mid-century, 87 percent of the bar was in private practice, 59 percent in
solo practice. By 1980, only one-third were solo practitioners .... ").
40. Robert L. Nelson et al., From Professional Dominance to Organisational
Dominance: Professionalism, Inequality, and Social Change Among Chicago Lawyers,
1975-1995, in REORGANISATION AND RESISTANCE: LEGAL PROFESSIONS CONFRONT A
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II. THE STUDIES/METHOD
This Article presents data about PILOs and how those
organizations have changed since 1975. The data are based on two
studies of PILOs. The first was conducted by Burton Weisbrod, Joel
Handler, and Neil Komesar and is presented in its entirety in Public
Interest Law: An Economic and Institutional Analysis. 3 The second
study was conducted by the authors of this Article and was designed,
in part, to replicate many of the questions about organizational
structure from the Weisbrod study. This Part of the Article describes
the methodologies of the two studies.
It is important to note that, although we are presenting data
about changes in organizational structure and function over time, this
is not what is known as a "panel study"' because the organizations
surveyed in the 1975 Weisbrod study are not necessarily the same
organizations surveyed by the authors of this Article in 2004.
Nonetheless, we believe that both studies are representative of the
PIL industry at the times they were conducted, and so comparisons
across time are meaningful.
A. Weisbrod et al.
In Public Interest Law: An Economic and Institutional Analysis,
Burton Weisbrod, Joel Handler, and Neil Komesar, together with a
number of co-authors, present findings from an impressive empirical
research project about the PIL industry.45 The study primarily
focuses on those organizations in the voluntary sector that engage in
PIL activities, although their book analyzes in some detail the
activities of "mixed firms" (those that engage in pro bono and for-
profit work).46
43. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
44. Panel studies use the same respondents (in our case, organizations) at Time 1 and
Time 2. EARL BABBLE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 103-04 (9th ed. 1998).
45. PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 4, at 50-60 (dissecting the PIL industry by
primarily focusing on its most visible and influential functions and actors).
46. See id. at 500-31 (discussing PIL activities in other countries). For the purposes of
this Article, we will not go into great detail summarizing the work of Handler et al. in the
public and private sectors except to highlight that Weisbrod et al. found that only a small
percentage of private practice is pro bono work and that only a small percentage of pro
bono work is characteristically similar to PIL activities. The authors note that this is
largely due to the fact that work done for clients in the private sector is not likely to
"generate significant external benefits" unlike the work done for issue-oriented
organizations by the PIL firms. Handler et al., supra note 5, at 67. In the public sector,
Legal Services Backup Centers, a successor to the Office of Economic Opportunity
("OEO"), "were nearly united in indicating a single target group as intended beneficiaries
1600 [Vol. 84
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The Weisbrod study identified eighty-six organizations that met
its definition of a PIL firm.47 Chapter four of Public Interest Law
describes the PIL industry by looking at the year of establishment,
number of lawyer and non-lawyer positions, income, activities, and
topic areas on which PIL firms worked.48 The study was not designed
to identify all of the PIL firms in existence at the time of the study.49
While this means we cannot use the Weisbrod study as a baseline to
look at the growth in the PIL field by the year 2004, it still is possible
to use the Weisbrod study as an accurate representation of PIL firm
characteristics in 1975 and suggest how the field has changed in the
intervening twenty-five years.50
B. Albiston and Nielsen
The study conducted by the authors of this Article primarily
concerns variation in strategy, structure, and mission among private
organizations that use law, at least in part, as a strategy to pursue
their goals.
1. Definition
Our definition of a PILO is similar to the one utilized by
Weisbrod to facilitate comparison across time. We sought to study:
organizations in the voluntary sector that employ at least one lawyer
at least part time, and whose activities (1) seek to produce significant
benefits for those who are external to the organization's participants,
and (2) involve at least one adjudicatory strategy.51
of all their activities." Id. at 68. This is "in sharp contrast to both the mixed firms and the
PIL firms." Id.
47. Handler et al., supra note 5, at 49. The study's working definition of a PIL firm
consists of those firms with the following characteristics: "1) they are part of the voluntary
sector; 2) they use primarily legal tools such as litigation; and 3) they are involved
primarily in actions which, if successful in accomplishing change, have a substantial
external benefits component or high public interest (PI) ratio." Id.
48. Id. at 50-55.
49. Id. at 49 ("We cannot offer a complete description of the industry because we do
not have all the necessary data.").
50. To study organizational change over time most accurately would be to conduct a
"panel study." As required by the Institutional Review Boards at the University of
Wisconsin, Madison; the University of California, Berkeley; and the American Bar
Foundation in accordance with federal regulations on conducting research on human
subjects, our research design includes guaranteeing confidentiality for our participants.
See Basic HHS Policy for Protection of Human Research Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.111
(2005). As such, we could not conduct a panel study without violating confidentiality.
51. This definition is a modified version of the one adopted by Weisbrod et al. in their
early study of PIL firms. See PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 4, at 49. Our definition
2006] 1601
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This definition excludes individual pro bono work in private firm
settings,52 organizations such as trade organizations formed primarily
to pursue benefits for their members, private for-profit businesses,
and government organizations. Like the Weisbrod study, we also
limit the study to organizations in the United States, leaving aside for
the moment the question of cross-national differences among
PILOs.53 We also exclude organizations that focus primarily on
criminal law and clients.54
We limited our study to organizations that employed at a
minimum one lawyer working at least part-time because we are
specifically interested in lawyers as agents for social change, their
different and perhaps changing roles in public interest organizations,
and how they resolve professional dilemmas unique to this practice
setting. Similarly, we required organizations to employ at least one
adjudicatory strategy because in our future work we seek to
understand how these lawyers integrate traditional adjudicatory
strategies with other strategies for social change, and how they
resolve potential conflicts between the two.
As this definition makes clear, ours is not a study of public
interest practice or "cause lawyering" in general because such a study
is broader than just traditional public interest firms and might better be labeled "public
interest law organizations" or "public interest litigating entities."
52. By studying lawyers who work in PILOs, we do not mean to discount the
important work of lawyers who provide pro bono legal services. The nature of pro bono
practice makes it difficult to know how much cause lawyering is being conducted by
lawyers outside of PILOs, though there are two recent studies that attempt to do just that.
See ABA PRO BONO REPORT, supra note 18, at 5. See generally Rebecca L. Sandefur,
Lawyers' Pro Bono Service and American-Style Civil Legal Assistance for the Poor (Feb.
20, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the North Carolina Law Review)
(examining state variation in civil pro bono activity).
53. See PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, supra note 4, at 500-31 (discussing briefly PIL
activities in other countries). For more on cross-national studies of PIL, see generally
CAUSE LAWYERING, supra note 30.
54. Criminal organizations tend to differ qualitatively from voluntary organizations
engaged in civil practice in many ways, including the stakes at risk, the incentives for
compromise or going forward, and the process through which the organizations find and
select their clients. For example, representation in criminal cases often is constitutionally
required and funded by the government. See Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 340
(1963) (guaranteeing court-appointed counsel in criminal cases pursuant to the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments). Criminal defense attorneys may have little choice in which
clients they represent. Even those criminal law-oriented organizations that do not rely on
government funding are likely to litigate almost exclusively against government entities.
Accordingly, many of the issues we sought to explore, including how external funding
environments influenced organizational strategies and structure, and how organizations
conceptualized and pursue their objectives are not as relevant to criminal organizations.
For these reasons, we chose to focus our study on private voluntary organizations that
have more flexibility and control over strategies and cases they choose.
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might also include, among other things, pro bono work by attorneys
in private practice and other, non-traditional forms of law practice."
Accordingly, we examine a more circumscribed subject: people who
come together to form an organization dedicated to pursuits
benefiting others and who utilize adjudicatory strategies to do so.
2. Sampling Frame and Strategy
Our study surveyed a national random sample of PILOs in the
United States. To produce a random sample of PILOs, we developed
a sampling frame of organizations that potentially met our criteria by
compiling an exhaustive list of public interest organizations engaged
in legal activity. That list was compiled using several sources,
including: (a) records of amicus briefs filed by public interest
organizations before the Supreme Court; (b) scholarly books and
articles that list PILOs; (c) directories of public interest organizations;
(d) lists of providers of free legal services obtained from state bar
associations and Internet web sites; (e) lists of organizations receiving
funding from Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts ("IOLTA")
obtained from state IOLTA programs;56 and (f) Internet searches to
identify potential public interest organizations. Our strategy was to
err on the side of inclusion and leave the final determination of
whether an organization met our definition until a later stage of the
sampling process.
By using multiple strategies we attempted to capture as diverse a
group of PILOs as possible. For example, our amicus brief strategy is
likely to capture organizations seeking to influence policy by
participating in high-profile litigation. In contrast, the information
from IOLTA programs and free legal service providers ensures that
smaller organizations that provide direct legal services are also
represented. We searched lists and national directories that spanned
the political spectrum and that captured a variety of organizations.
55. Indeed, defining PIL, or "cause lawyering" in general, is not an easy task.
Although in the future we hope to compare our findings to research about cause lawyers
in other organizational settings, our goal for this project is to examine variation within
public interest organizations themselves. We chose this approach because too often these
organizations are treated as an undifferentiated category, rather than a diverse population
in its own right. See Carrie Menkel Meadow, The Causes of Cause Lawyering: Toward an
Understanding of the Motivation and Commitment of Social Justice Lawyers, in CAUSE
LAWYERING, supra note 30, at 33 ("Descriptions of cause lawyering raise a host of
boundary questions.").
56. We contacted IOLTA programs in each state. A list of IOLTA programs
compiled by the ABA is available at ABA Comm'n on Lawyers' Trust Accounts,
Directory of IOLTA Programs, http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/iolta/ioltdir.html (last
updated Mar. 9, 2006).
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By the end of our search, new sources were typically redundant with
the organizations that we had already identified.
This approach yielded a sampling frame of 4,588 organizations,
though not all of the organizations ultimately met our criteria for
inclusion. We then drew a random sample of 1,200 organizations
from the sampling frame57 and narrowed the sample to include only
those organizations that met our criteria.58 This yielded a sample of
327 organizations. We then contacted each organization to identify
the appropriate individual within the organization to answer basic
questions about the organization's structure and activities. All
respondents were lawyers, typically the managing partner, director, or
head of legal services.
3. Surveying the Organizations
In 2004, we conducted a telephone survey consisting of primarily
closed-ended questions and a few open-ended questions that could be
answered with a short response. The survey addressed the
organization's history and mission, budget and structure, goals and
activities, and strategies for pursuing those goals.
Respondents were mailed an advance letter regarding the nature
of the study, and returned letters were traced to find accurate
information for each organization. 9 Organization representatives
were then contacted by phone to complete the survey. Fifty-seven
organizations were excluded from the study based on the initial
57. To ensure our sample contained enough valid PILOs for the study, we needed to
know approximately the proportion of organizations on the comprehensive list that fit our
definition. We estimated this proportion by drawing a preliminary random sample of 100
organizations from the list. This sample yielded twenty-two organizations that fit our
definition. We sought a final sample of between 250 and 300 PILOs; accordingly, we drew
a random sample of 1,200 organizations from the comprehensive list.
58. Our definition required that the PILO employ at least one lawyer at least part-
time and use an adjudicatory strategy of some sort. As such, representatives needed to
answer "yes" to the following questions to be included in the study: (1) Does your
organization employ at least one lawyer full or part time? (2a) Does your organization file
amicus curiae briefs in state or federal court? (2b) Does your organization represent
clients in cases in state court, in federal court, or in administrative hearings? and (3) Are
the activities of your organization intended to benefit someone beyond the employees and
members, if any, in your organization?
We accomplished this narrowing process through information available from
publicly available sources such as web sites or literature put out by the organization. In
some instances we contacted the organization directly by telephone to clarify its status or,
where only a mailing address was available, by sending a short questionnaire that asked
about adjudicatory strategies and employment of lawyers in order to clarify the
organization's status.




screening questions because they did not meet our criteria despite our
previous efforts to ensure that they did.
Of the remaining 270 organizations that fit our criteria, 221
completed the survey yielding a response rate of eighty-two percent,
6
0
which is quite good for an organizational survey such as this.61
III. TRANSFORMATIONS OF PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
ORGANIZATIONS: 1975-2004
Handler and his co-authors summarized the typical PILO this
way:
Very few of these PIL firms use legal tools exclusively. Rather,
most use, to varying degrees, non-legal tools and so engage in
public interest non-law activity as well as PIL activity .... The
average firm employs about seven lawyers and five other
professionals, and ... about 43 percent [of total income] comes
from foundation grants. Sixty percent of the average firm's
effort ... [is] devoted to legal work. A typical firm
concentrates over 70 percent of its effort in a single area.., and
intends all its actions to benefit either the general population or
some specific subgroup of the population.62
This Part places this now-historic picture of PILOs next to our
new data about the organizational structure of the PIL firm to
observe the transformation in the PILO industry over the last nearly
thirty years.
A. Growth of the Industry
The Weisbrod study surveyed the "core" of the PIL industry,
which was comprised of eighty-six firms.63 The Weisbrod study did
not purport to capture the universe of PILOs in the field; thus, we
cannot know precisely how much the industry has grown as measured
by the number of PILOs.64 By projection from our data, we estimate
that there were a little over 1,000 PILOs operating in the United
60. See BABBIE, supra note 44, at 256.
61. In an attempt to improve the response rate after exhaustive attempts to reach
some organizations, the survey was converted from a CATI instrument to a paper and
pencil form and mailed to all non-respondents and refusals. Two organizations completed
the mail survey rather than the telephone format.
62. Handler et al., supra note 5, at 60.
63. Id.
64. As such, we limit our analyses to proportional changes rather than looking at
change in absolute numbers.
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States in 2000.65 The growth in the legal profession generally in the
same period was quite dramatic. For example, between 1980 and
2000, the number of lawyers practicing in the United States roughly
doubled-from 542,205 to 1,066,328.6  Similarly, between 1980 and
2000, the number of law firms grew dramatically-from 38,482 to
47,563.67 Thus, although there were many PIL firms in 2000, they
were only a tiny fraction of the legal profession as a whole.
B. Growing Staffs and Rationalization of Practice
Like other organizations engaged in law practice,66  the
organizational structures of PILOs have changed significantly in the
last quarter-century. PILOs are much larger now according to almost
any measure: the number of attorneys employed, total staff, and
operating budgets. This growth tracks the trend in the profession in
general as private firms were also growing in size during this period.
For example, in 1980 there were 2,682 firms with more than ten
lawyers; by 2000 there were 4,962.69
Table 1 shows the number of lawyer and non-lawyer employees
in PILOs in 1975 and 2004.
65. Our initial draw of 1,200 organizations yielded 270 PILOs for a rate of .225.
Multiplying the number of organizations on our initial list (4,588) by .225 yields 1,032
organizations. Although we conducted the survey in 2004, the sampling frame was
constructed in 2000 and 2001.
66. CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL
PROFESSION IN 2000, at 1 (2004).
67. See Nelson et al., supra note 40, at 317-19.
68. JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF
THE BAR (2005) 12-13, 288-95; see also Nelson et al., supra note 40, at 317-19.




Number of Lawyer and Non-Lawyer Positions in PILOs, 1975-2004
Number of Percent of Number of Percent of
Lawyer Responding Non-Lawyer Responding
Positions Organizations Positions Organizations
1975 2004 1975 2004
0 - - 0 22% -
1-2 31% 19% 1-2 33% 8%
3-5 31% 28% 3-5 28% 17%
6-9 20% 13% 6-9 7% 17%
10 3% 4% 10 - 5%
11-20 11% 14% 11-20 7% 17%
21-30 1% 9% 21-30 - 8%
31-40 4% 5% 31-40 1% 6%
41-50 - 4% 41-50 - 5%
51-60 - 1% 51-60 4%
61-70 1% 61-70 1%
71-80 1% 71-80 2%
81-90 1% 81-90 2%
91-100 91-100 2%
101-110 - 1% 101-110 - 1%
111-120 1% 1%
121-150 - -
Over-1 50 - 4%
Total 100% 100% Total 100% 100%
n=72 n=217 n=72 n=212
Total Lawyer Total Non-
Positions in 478 2924 Lawyer 384 8748
Sapiis~ iPositions in
Samples'" Samples
Mean 7 13 Mean 5 40
* Source: Handler et al., supra note 5, at 51 tbl.4.2 (presenting the 1975 data from the
Weisbrod study).
Totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.
It is important to remember that "total lawyer positions in samples" does not represent all
of the lawyers practicing in PILOs in either 1975 or 2004. Because we do not know precisely
the proportion of the field represented by Handler's 1975 data, we cannot estimate the number
of lawyers practicing in PILOs in 1975.
Note that the proportion of PILOs that employ very few
attorneys declined in the period 1975 to 2004. In 1975, PILOs
employed an average of seven attorneys, but by 2004 that number had
almost doubled, rising to thirteen attorneys. In 1975, nearly one-third
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of PILOs (31%) employed only one or two lawyers and in 2004, that
number was under 20%.
At the other end of the organizational size spectrum, the number
of large PILOs also grew over the period. In 1975 only 5% of PILOs
employed more than twenty lawyers while in 2004, 23% of PILOs
employed more than twenty attorneys. What might be thought of as
"mega-PILOs" (those employing forty or more attorneys) did not
emerge until after 1975. In 1975, the largest PILOs employed
between thirty-one and forty attorneys (4%) and by 2004, the
proportion of PILOs that employ between thirty-one and forty
attorneys had not changed (5%). But, fully another 9% of PILOs
employed more than forty attorneys by 2004 and the largest PILO in
our study employed 110 attorneys.
The number of non-lawyers employed by PILOs also has grown
dramatically. In 1975, in addition to employing an average of seven
attorneys, PILOs averaged five non-lawyer employees. By 2004, that
number had climbed to forty. In 1975, 22% of PILOs were staffed
entirely by attorneys. In 2004, not one PILO that we surveyed was
staffed entirely by attorneys. At the other end of the scale with large
PILOs, the changes are equally dramatic. In 1975, only 2% of PILOs
employed more than twenty non-lawyers and in 2004, 36% of PILOs
employed more than twenty non-lawyers and 4% employed over 150
non-lawyers.
We also see indications of organizational rationalization among
PILOs, that is, the application of modern management techniques.
Perhaps the most salient indication of this process is captured by the
ratio of lawyers to non-lawyers.70 According to Handler et al., in
1975, for each one and a quarter lawyers employed at a PILO, there
was one non-lawyer staff person employed.71 That is to say, the
typical PILO in 1975 employed more lawyers than non-lawyers, but
the ratio was relatively close to one-to-one.72 By 2004 the ratio of
lawyers to non-lawyers had reversed dramatically. In 2004, for each
lawyer employed by a PILO, there were an average of over six non-
lawyers employed. This ratio seems to suggest that like their private
sector counterparts, PILOs are more efficiently leveraging their
70. See MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 65 (1991).
71. Handler et al., supra note 5, at 51 tbl.4.2.
72. Handler et al. seem to have constructed the ratio of lawyers to non-lawyers using
the overall means from Table 2. This method is not the most accurate method; we




lawyer professionals by allowing support staff to perform an
increasing proportion of the functions of the firm. These shifts reflect
the relative cost of attorneys, to be sure, but they may also indicate a
mimetic process at workV3-PILOs are adopting the practices of other
law firms and legal departments to leverage lawyers and entrust much
work to non-lawyers.
Some of the increased organization size we observe by 2004 may
be due to the entry of large voluntary organizations into the category
of PILOs by adding adjudicatory strategies to their representational
approaches. In other words, over the past twenty-nine years, legal
strategies for change may have seeped into the strategic repertoire of
more organizations in the voluntary, non-profit sector. These
organizations would not have been captured in Weisbrod's study in
1975.
Another measure of the growth of PILOs is in their budgets,
which increased dramatically between 1975 and 2004. To
meaningfully compare 1975 and 2004 data, 1975 figures were adjusted
for inflation using the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation
Calculator.74 In this Part of the Article, all dollar figures are
presented in 2004 dollars unless otherwise noted.
73. See Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147,
151-52 (1983).
74. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, CPI Inflation Calculator,
http://146.142.4.24/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).
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Table 2




Total Income in 2004 Percent Responding Percent Responding
thousands of dollars Organizations 1975 Organizations 2004

















$3506 and Over 11% 20%
Total 100% 100%
n=71 n=187
* Source: Handier et al., supra note 5, at 56 tbl.4.6 (presenting the 1975 data from the
Weisbrod study).
** 1975 figures converted to 2004 dollars using U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Inflation Index.
See supra note 74.
Totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.
Table 2 shows that in 2004, nearly half (42%) of PILOs had
annual operating budgets greater than $1.4 million while in 1975 only
26% of PILOs had budgets in this range. The percentage of PILOs
operating with budgets of $3.5 million and greater more than doubled
in the period (from 11% of all PILOs in 1975 to 29% of all PILOs in
2004). Although this growth is striking, there are still many PILOs
operating on relatively small budgets. In 1975, 40% of PILOs
managed on $523,000 or less annually. In 2004, only 28% of PILOs
did so. As with the number of attorney employees, the growth in
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PILO budgets is dramatic, but a focus on 2004 makes it clear that
many PILOs are still relatively small organizations and relatively
resource-poor when compared to other practice settings.75
C. Shift from Single Issue and Single Function to Multiple Issues and
Multiple Functions
Table 3 presents data about how PILOs in the year 2004
characterized what they do. Using Weisbrod's original categories of
activities, we asked respondents to indicate the percentage of the
organization's effort that is spent on each of the following activities:
legal (including litigation, negotiation, adjudication, and/or
monitoring); legislative (including lobbying, testifying, drafting model
legislation, and/or other advocacy work directed toward government
organizations or officials); research, education, and outreach
(including disseminating information, community education,
publications, and/or community organizing); and internal
administration (including fundraising and other in-house activities).
Table 3
Percent PILO Effort Expended on Activities, 1975-2004
% Effort Legal Work Legislative Work Other Research, Internal
Expended I Ed., & Outreach Administration
1975 2004 1975 2004 1975 2004 1975 2004
0 - 1% 25% 32% 22% 5% 14% 2%
1-19% - 9% 54% 57% 47% 60% 63% 87%
20-39% 14% 6% 15% 9% 21% 22% 22% 10%
40-59% 35% 18% 4% 1% 7% 10% 1% 1%
60-79% 25% 37% 1% 1% 3% 1% - -
80-99% 24% 28% - - - 2%
100% 3% 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
n=72 n=209 n=72 n=213 n=72 n=209 n=72 n=209
Mean% 60% 63% 10% 7% 14% 19% 12% 11%
Effort
* Source: Handler et al., supra note 5, at 55 tbl.4.5 (presenting the 1975 data from the
Weisbrod study).
** Totals may not equal 100% due to rounding.
75. HEINZ ET AL., supra note 68, at 281-82 (discussing the practice size of law firms
and government law offices).
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It would appear from Table 3 that the mean amount of effort
that PILOs expend on these various activities has not changed much
over time.76 In 1975, the mean amount of effort spent doing legal
work was 60%, and in 2004, that number increased to 63%. The only
change of any magnitude is in the category of other research,
education, and outreach, which grew from 14% of overall effort in
1975 to 19% of overall effort in 2004. That gain was offset by small
declines in the categories of legislative work, and internal
administration. However, the means mask changes worth noting.
Although the mean effort in each category is little changed over
time, a more detailed look at the response to this question reveals
interesting variations. For example, a much higher proportion of
organizations are doing little or no legal work than was the case in
1975. In 2004, 10% of PILOs reported that they devoted less than
one-fifth of their organizational effort to legal activities; this is a
dramatic increase from 1975, when all of the organizations included in
the study devoted at least one-fifth of their effort to legal activity. At
the other end of the spectrum, we see that fewer organizations report
devoting 100% of their effort to legal activities, down from 3% in
1975 to 1% in 2004.
Another important change in the activities pursued by PILOs is
in the amount of effort that organizations expend on research,
education, and outreach. Research, education, and outreach
constituted a more significant part of organizational effort in 2004
than in 1975. The interesting changes in this category of activities are
at the extremes. In 1975, the percentage of organizations that
expended no effort on research, education, and outreach was 22%.
By 2004, the percentage had dropped to 5%.
Thus, while in 2004 PILOs continued primarily to emphasize
legal activities, it is almost unheard of that PILOs did not also engage
in research and outreach. We are not yet in a position to analyze why
this shift occurred. It might be, for example, a necessity for
fundraising. Yet, given that a much larger share of PILO funding
came from government sources in 2004, it is more likely that this shift
represents a change in how PILOs define their mission. Our research
suggests that PILOs have moved beyond litigation as the sole focus of
social change.
76. Figures reported in each column represent the percent of PILOs that expended a
given level of effort on a given category of activities. For example, in 1975, 14% of
organizations expended 20-30% of effort on legal work; in 2004, 6% of organizations
expended 20-39% of effort on legal work.
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D. Pluralization and Polarization
In the earlier study, Weisbrod and his colleagues asked
informants from PILOs about their organization's efforts devoted to
twelve topical areas: civil liberties, environment, consumer
protection, employment, education, media reform, health, welfare,
housing, voting, occupational safety and health, and other. In 2004,
we asked again about these twelve categories.
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Table 4
Percent Effort Expended by PILOs by Topic Area, 1975-2004
Civil Liberties Environmental I Consumer Employment
%Effort Protection Protection
Expended
1975 2004 1975 2004 1975 2004 1975 2004
0 58% 34% 66% 76% 62% 43% 54% 37%
1-19% 15% 48% 10% 18% 18% 44% 24% 58%
20-39% 10% 10% 11% 2% 7% 11% 13% 4%
40-59% 4% 5% 3% 1% 4% 2% 1% -
60-79% 1% 2% 1% 1% 4% 1% 6% -
80-99% 3% 1% 1% 1% 3% 1% 1% 1%
100% 8% 2% 7% 1% 1% - 1%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
n=71 n=199 n=71 n=209 N=71 n=202 n=71 n=196
Mean% 17% 12% 14% 5% 12% 8% 12% 6%
Effort I
% Effort Education Media Reform Health Care Welfare Benefits
Expended -
1975 2004 1975 2004 1975 2004 1975 2004
0 61% 31% 83% 93% 65% 37% 75% 42%
1-19% 23% 54% 8% 6% 20% 54% 10% 45%
20-39% 8% 8% 3% 1% 15% 7% 10% 10%
40-59% 4% 4% - 1% 2% 4% 2%
60-79% 3% 2% - 1% - 1%
80-99% - 1% - - -
100% 1% 1% 6% - 1% -
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
n=71 n=197 n=71 n=217 N=71 n=201 n=71 n=203
Mean% 9% 10% 6% 1% 6% 8% 6% 8%
Effort I
Occaltioalthy
% Effort Housing Voting Rights Occupational Other
Expended
1975 2004 1975 2004 1975 2004 1975 2004
0 70% 40% 87% 80% 92% 82% 72% 50%
1-19% 23% 38% 8% 17% 7% 18% 13% 21%
20-39% 6% 17% 3% 2% 1% 8% 15%
40-59% - 3% - 1% 1% - 1% 7%
60-79% - 1% 1% - 4%
80-99% - 2% - - 3% 2%
100% 1% 1% - - - - 3% 2%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
n=71 n=201 n=71 n=208 N=71 n=212 n=71 n=206
Mean% 5% 12% 2% 2% 1% 1% 9% 15%
Effort I
* Source: Handier et al., supra note 5, at 57 tbl.4.7 (presenting the 1975 data from the
Weisbrod study).
** Totals may not equal 100% due to rounding
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Note first the rows labeled "100% effort expended." These rows
show the percentage of PILOs that report that they dedicate 100% of
their organization's effort to a single cause. In 1975, over one quarter
(29%) of PILOs were single-issue organizations; by 2004, that
number had dropped to 7%. This diversification in topic area is
significant because it means that these organizations are practicing
law, researching, writing, and conducting education and outreach
programs with respect to multiple legal issues.
In addition to the simple fact that many more organizations are
devoted to multiple causes, we see important shifts in the effort
devoted to the various causes about which we inquired. About 8% of
PILOs devoted 100% of their effort to civil liberties in 1975, and that
number fell to 2% by 2004. Similarly, 7% of PILOs were devoted
entirely to environmental protection in 1975 and that number had
dropped to 1% by 2004. In 1975, there were PILOs devoted entirely
to the issues of consumer rights, employment, media reform, and
welfare rights, but by 2004, we observe no PILOs devoted solely to
any of these causes. This represents perhaps one of the most
significant changes in the organizational character of PILOs-there is
much more topical diversity within organizations than we saw in 1975.
The mean percent effort expended on various topical areas also
is instructive. The rows labeled "mean effort expended" can be
thought of as the total percent effort expended by the PILO industry
on the various topical areas.7 These data show the most dramatic
declines in the following areas of practice: civil liberties (from 17% in
1975 down to 12% in 2004); environmental protection (from 14% in
1975 down to 5% in 2004); consumer protection (from 12% in 1975
down to 8% in 2004); employment (from 12% in 1975 down to 6% in
2004); and media reform (from 6% in 1975 down to 1% in 2004).
There were also, however, sharp increases in efforts directed at
housing issues (from 5% in 1975 up to 12% in 2004).
We also inquired about four new categories not included in the
Weisbrod study that better capture more conservative PILO agendas:
promoting traditional values, free market/free enterprise, law and
order, and protecting property rights. When combined, the four new
77. Respondents were asked: "Does your organization devote any effort at all to civil
liberties, environmental protection, consumer protection, employment, education, media
reform, health care, welfare benefits, housing, voting rights, occupational health and
safety, promoting traditional values, free enterprise/free market, law and order, protecting
property rights, or other?" For each activity that the respondent indicated the
organization expended effort, the respondent was asked to estimate what percent of the
organization's effort was expended on that activity.
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categories made up 13% of all PILO effort in 2004. Protecting
traditional values represents 2% of all PILO activity, free market/free
enterprise represents 1%, law and order represents 4%, and
protecting private property represents 6% (not shown in the table).
It is important to remember that these data may not represent the
total conservative PILO effort, however, as some politically
conservative organizations may be captured in the civil liberties
category.
E. Increased Reliance on Government Funding and Other Funding
Changes
Sources of income also changed for PILOs from 1975 to 2004. In
1975, the single largest income source for PILOs was foundation
grants; 42% of all funding for PILOs came from foundation grants in
that year. This percentage is not surprising considering that many
large granting organizations (including the Ford Foundation) made
access to justice and law reform a high priority for funding efforts at
that time.78 The low proportion of PILO income from federal funds
in 1975 (8%) may have been due to the fact that the LSC had not yet
become a major source of funds.
By the year 2004, sources of income changed dramatically. In
2004, the greatest sources of funding were state and local funds,
accounting for 28% of PILO funding. This funding trend is a
dramatic reversal from 1975 when state and local funds were at the
bottom of the list, accounting for only 1% of PILO funding. In 2004,
federal funds and foundation grants were the second greatest sources
of income (21% each). This number represents a drop by half in the
percentage of foundation grant money supporting PILOs (in 1975,
42% of funding came from foundation grants) and a significant
increase in federal funds.
The dramatically increased reliance of PILOs on government
funding is initially surprising given increasing government hostility
toward the social change efforts of these organizations. However, a
closer examination reveals the growth in government funding is not
an unmitigated benefit for PILOs. Government funding comes with
strings attached, allowing the government to partially control PILOs'
social change agendas. For example, in 1996, a series of new federal
restrictions were placed upon organizations that accepted LSC funds.
78. HARRISON & JAFFE, supra note 16, at 5 (stating that the Ford Foundation is a
"principal source of support" for PILOs and citing the expansion of "[flederal and
foundation-supported neighborhood legal services").
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The new rules prohibited LSC organizations from taking class action
lawsuits, challenging welfare reform, collecting attorney's fees,
rulemaking, lobbying, litigating on behalf of prisoners, representing
clients in drug-related public housing evictions, and representing
certain categories of aliens. 79 Thus, the government simultaneously
provides resources to PILOs and negatively impacts their efforts to
promote social change.
IV. LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION FUNDED PILOs IN 2004
Given the increasing role that federal funding plays for many
PILOs, we were interested in how the LSC-funded80 (publicly-
funded) organizations compared to organizations that did not receive
LSC funds (privately-funded). This Part of the Article compares
LSC-funded PILOs operating in 2004 to PILOs that did not receive
LSC funds in 2004 rather than comparing 1975 and 2004 PILOs.
Of course, the majority of public interest organizations did not
receive federal funds in 2004, and LSC-funded PILOs have some
unique characteristics relative to the rest of the sample. The fifty-four
PILOs (24.8% of the total sample) that reported that they receive
LSC funds tend to be clustered in the higher budget categories,
employ more lawyers, and are more oriented to direct legal services
than the organizations that do not receive LSC funds.
We have budget data for fifty-one LSC-funded organizations.
LSC-funded PILOs have significantly larger budgets than PILOs that
do not receive LSC funds. The mean budget of LSC-funded PILOs is
$3,706,372, while the mean budget for organizations that do not
receive LSC funds is $2,934,190.81
The larger budgets of the organizations that receive LSC funds
may not be surprising given the size of government contracts, but
these organizations are larger in other ways as well. For example,
LSC organizations employ many more attorneys than their non-LSC-
79. Regulations of the Legal Services Corporation can be found at 45 C.F.R. §§ 1600-
1644 (2005). For a summary and history of legislation regarding the LSC, see William P.
Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and the
Legal Services Corporation from the 1960s through the 1990s, 17 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REv. 241, 241 (1948). See generally LSC Home Page, http://www.lsc.gov (last visited Apr.
19, 2006) (providing general information about the LSC, as well as laws and regulations
related to the LSC).
80. The LSC is the government organization that funds many PILOs, particularly
those engaged in poverty law practice. The LSC consists of a Board of Directors
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, 42 U.S.C. § 2996c(a) (2000).
PILOs that receive LSC funds are subject to unique restrictions. See supra Part III.E.
81. A t-test for equality of means revealed that this is a significant difference, p< .001.
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funded counterparts. The mean number of attorneys employed by
LSC-funded PILOs in 2004 was 31.75, while the mean number of
attorneys employed by non-LSC-funded PILOs in that year was
7.75.82
LSC-funded PILOs are far more likely to perform direct services
than their non-LSC-funded counterparts. The mean percent effort
devoted to direct legal services of organizations that receive LSC
funds is 83%, while for organizations that do not receive LSC funds,
the effort devoted to legal service is 55 %.83
One interpretation of these data is that LSC-funded
organizations are prospering and providing much needed legal
assistance to the poor. These organizations have large attorney staffs,
large budgets, and perform primarily direct legal services (as the new
regulations would have them do). They are performing no law
reform activity, but operate essentially as another arm of the welfare
state by providing direct legal services to the poor.
However, the emphasis on direct service by large LSC-funded
providers should not be seen as evidence that the LSC is effectively
meeting the civil legal needs of the poor. Despite their large budgets,
these organizations only scratch the surface of legal need. Many
studies suggest that as much as eighty percent of the civil legal needs
of the poor go unmet.8
In addition, the PIL industry is a very small sector of the legal
profession as a whole. We estimate that there are approximately
13,700 lawyers working in PILOs in 2004.85 In 2005, there were
82. Supra note 81.
83. Supra note 81.
84. See BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC: THE FINAL
REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEY 251-57 (1976). See generally HELAINE M. BARNETT,
LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION, DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE
CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-INCOME AMERICANS (2005), available
at http://www.Isc.gov/press/documents/LSC%2OJustice%2OGapFINAL_1001.pdf
(documenting the "civil legal needs of low-income individuals and families" in the United
States); TIMOTHY L. BERTSCHY ET AL., LAWYERS TRUST FUND OF ILLINOIS, THE
LEGAL AID SAFETY NET: A REPORT ON THE LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME
ILLINOISANS (2005), available at www.Itf.org/legalneeds.htm (documenting the unmet
legal needs of Illinoisans).
85. This number is a projection. Our sample of 1,200 organizations yielded 270
organizations for a rate of 23%. Our sampling frame consists of 4,588 organizations, so we
then multiplied the 4,588 organizations by the 23% rate to get a total of 1,055 PILOs. We




961,000 lawyers practicing in the United States.86 This means that
only about 1.4% of practicing lawyers work in PILOs.
CONCLUSION
Let us start our conclusion by comparing the picture of the PIL
industry of the year 2004 we have developed here to the overall
picture from Handler and his colleagues' description of the field in
1975. To paraphrase Handler, we would say:
As in 1975, in 2004 very few of these PIL firms use legal tools
exclusively. Rather, most use, to varying degrees, non-legal
tools and so engage in public interest non law activity as well as
PIL activity. The average firm employs about thirteen lawyers
(up from seven) and forty other professionals (up from 5), of
which [the largest single source of income] is 28 percent state
and local funds (as opposed to 43 percent from foundation
grants). Sixty-three percent of the average firm's effort (up
from sixty percent) ... is devoted to legal work. A typical firm
does not concentrate on one topic area (versus concentrating
over 70 percent of its effort in a single area in 1975). 7
We have indeed seen very significant changes in the field of
PILOs. In a sense, the field has "matured." It now consists of larger
organizations, paralleling organizational growth in the legal
profession more generally. Like other sectors of sophisticated law
practice, the PIL sector has witnessed trends toward leveraging
lawyer talent with the efforts of non-lawyers. It has also become
more diverse as the causes served by PILOs have become more
diverse.
But these trends also embody many of the tensions in public
interest law that have been present for many years and remain
unresolved. While we must analyze our data in more detail, it
appears that there now are two PIL industries-publicly-funded and
privately-funded. On the one hand, we now see PILOs that receive a
large amount of their funding from the LSC and other government
agencies, largely provide direct services, and are statutorily prohibited
from engaging in many law reform activities. As a result, this sector
of the field has grown, but also has become increasingly constrained.
86. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employed Persons by Detailed
Occupation, Sex, Race, and Hispanic or Latino Ethnicity, 1940 to Date,
http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaatll.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2006).
87. Handler et al., supra note 5, at 60. These are Handler et al.'s exact words but
highlighting the more recent data, with Handler et al.'s numbers in parenthetical.
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Despite the increasing size of some organizations that rely
heavily on federal and state funding, these organizations fall far short
of delivering anything approaching an adequate level of civil
representation to the poor. For example, using census data to
estimate the number of people eligible to receive legal services from
LSC-funded organizations (those who live in households with
incomes less than 125% of the federal poverty rate), recent research
demonstrates that the client to legal aid attorney ratio for those living
in poverty is 1:6,861, while for Americans overall, the ratio of private
lawyers to individuals is 1:525.88 Thus, lawyers who work in LSC-
funded organizations attempt to meet an enormous potential legal
need with resources far inferior to those available to private clients.
Moreover, public funding comes at a price. These lawyers face
significant demands at a time when government constraints on LSC
organizations restrict their ability to leverage limited resources into
sweeping legal reform through class actions or social change
litigation.
In sharp contrast to the publicly-funded sector, we see a sector of
privately-funded organizations that, while often smaller in budget and
size, are free to pursue law reform activities as they please. Because
this sector retains the professional autonomy to pursue social change
through law, it may be a much more potent force for systemic change
than the larger LSC-funded organizations despite significantly smaller
budgets. Unlike the early period of PIL activity, this sector is now
populated by conservative as well as liberal groups, by groups
concerned with interests of the middle class, the wealthy, and the
socially powerful, as well as the poor and socially disadvantaged.
Weisbrod et al. stated in 1975 that PILOs were at a crossroads,
and that their future would largely be determined by the nature of the
funding support PILOs received. Those words were prophetic. Our
study demonstrates that PILOs have grown the most in sectors
supported by government funding, where lawyers primarily
representing people in poverty are most constrained in efforts at
systemic change. The privately-funded sector of PILOs remains a
context where lawyers can seek to have maximum impact on social
88. BARNE-IT, supra note 84, at 17. This comparison is useful to show the magnitude
of the difference, but it is not the entire picture because it does not include lawyers
working in PILOs that do not receive LSC money and who serve individuals in poverty.
Nonetheless, the ratio would not change all that much even if they were included.
Similarly, the number of lawyers to "ordinary citizens" may over-count lawyers who do
not serve individuals but only serve businesses. Nonetheless, as a rough take on the
disparity in legal services for the rich and poor, the comparison is as illuminating as it is
dramatic.
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policy through law, yet liberal groups no longer have a monopoly in
this sector. Private power has realized that it too can lay claim to the
mantle of "public interest."
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